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Communicable diseases pose a formidable challenge for public policy. The
current paper sets out a new conceptual framework for the analysis of treat-
ments in the context of communicable diseases, under diﬀerent market struc-
tures and epidemiological scenarios. Using numerical simulations, we present a
number of results that yield fresh insights into the role of drug prices and regu-
lations. First, we show when a monopoly’s price and prevalence path converge
to a nonzero steady-state. This expands on the intuition that a pharmaceutical
company may have an incentive to keep a communicable disease alive to pre-
serve its market. In contrast, a planner typically prices so as to quickly eradicate
the disease, making welfare under mandatory universal treatment very close to
the ﬁrst-best outcome. If eradication is impossible, the planner still subsidizes
treatments as long as the prevalence can be kept in check. The presence of
drug resistance exacerbates the welfare diﬀerence between a monopoly and the
social planner. Nevertheless, because the negative externalities from resistance
compete with the positive externalities of treatment, we show that there are
circumstances in which a mixed competition/monopoly regime does better than
competition alone. Going beyond the case of communicable diseases, this has
important implications for the design of many drug patents.
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1 Introduction
As the world becomes ever more interconnected, so the threat of communicable dis-
eases has soared in recent years.1 People travel more frequently, faster, and more
widely than before, and they bring with them potentially hazardous micro-organisms.
The recent outbreak of SARS has exempliﬁed how a new virus jumping the species
barrier in rural China could within weeks kill hundreds, sicken thousands, quarantine
tens of thousands, and result in a multi-billion dollar crisis worldwide.
This paper examines the role of pricing and certain regulations in the context of
communicable diseases. We propose a new conceptual framework for the analysis of
treatments (as opposed to immunization2) under diﬀerent market structures where
(possibly competing) external eﬀects are present. We thus provide fresh insights into a
pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing strategy, and compare it with that of a social
planner. Then, from a welfare comparison that also includes perfect competition and
mandatory universal treatment outcomes we derive policy implications using various
epidemiological scenarios.
What happens generally in terms of pricing in the presence of market power, exter-
nalities and heterogeneous agents in a dynamic environment is not well-understood.
In particular, agent-based models of economic epidemiology are inescapably diﬃcult
to solve analytically beyond two periods or outside a steady-state. Hence the major
1See www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/
2Immunization is a prophylactic step, therefore vaccines represent an investment in health and
from an economic perspective fall in the speciﬁc category of durable goods. These entail a totally
diﬀerent approach and have diﬀerent implications in terms of pricing and policy making that we
shall not get into here. See Philipson (2000) and Gersovitz and Hammer (2003) for review articles
on the economics of communicable diseases.
1contribution of this paper is to formally solve the monopolist’s and planner’s dynamic
problems using numerical simulations. As it turns out, this approach proves very use-
ful, uncovering important regularities.3 We select the parameters (the discount factor,
cost of the treatment and speed of disease transmission - and later on exogenous in-
fection rate and drug resistance diﬀusion) within our model to meaningfully span the
broadest range of qualitatively diﬀerent cases.
Our key ﬁndings from this exercise are as follows. The monopolist’s optimal price
lies above the myopic price and the prevalence path typically converges to a non-zero
steady-state. In contrast, the planner chooses to eradicate the disease if the cost
of the treatment is low enough and the discount factor high enough. Consequently,
welfare under mandatory universal treatment is generically very close to the ﬁrst-
best. Adding an exogenous infection rate to the model conﬁrms the robustness of
the planner’s aggressive subsidization strategy: as long as the disease can be kept in
check, prices remain below marginal cost even though eradication is then impossible.
Because a private ﬁrm would never extinguish an epidemic, drug resistance can
exacerbate the welfare diﬀerence between the outcomes under a monopoly and a social
planner. Yet, if the competing, negative externality of drug use outweighs its posi-
tive externality leading to overconsumption, the planner would need to price above
marginal cost and the performance of the monopoly might dominate that under com-
petition. We show this has important implications for the management of intellectual
property rights here and also beyond the case of communicable diseases.
Economic theory has looked into communicable diseases in several ways. Brito
et al. (1991) and Francis (1997) respectively analyze externalities associated with
vaccines in a static environment with heterogeneous agents and under a dynamic
3“Undoubtedly, further progress will depend on more numerical work” (Gersovitz and Hammer,
2004, p. 25). See also Gersovitz and Hammer (2005) in the context of vector-borne infectious
diseases (as opposed to those spread from person to person).
2structure with homogeneous agents. Goldman and Lightwood (2002) apply cost min-
imization techniques in the canonical SIS epidemiology model. Barrett (2003) and
Barrett and Hoel (2004) explore the issue of disease eradication through vaccines.
Auld (2003) investigates the importance of rational expectations on the course of an
epidemic. Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) provide a general framework for discussing
the infection and prevention externalities that characterize communicable diseases
and the role of government interventions. These studies have in common a market
power-free environment.
Departing from that assumption, Geoﬀard and Philipson (1997) advance that a
vaccine monopolist faces an unconventional incentive to keep a disease, and thus its
market, alive. Their analysis shows that a steady-state of infection may be compat-
ible with a constant price. However, the study left a number of issues unresolved,
primarily the optimality of a constant price for the monopolist and of a constant
subsidy for the planner. More recently, Kessing and Nuscheler (2005) reexamine the
vaccine monopoly situation under income heterogeneity in a static framework and
demonstrate how the monopolist may strategically leave the poor susceptible so as to
increase the willingness to pay of the rich. Our approach builds on those works insofar
as it considers treatment externalities under market power, and from an agent-based
model characterizes the optimal prevalence and price paths in a dynamic framework
and tells us more precisely what they depend on. It provides ﬁrm support for Geof-
fard and Philipson’s (1997) main intuitions and for Kessing and Nuscheler’s (2005)
claim that their conclusions extend to a dynamic setting.
As for the growing literature on drug resistance (which may be thought of as a
communicable disease within infectious micro-organisms),4 absence of market power is
4See Tisdell (1982), Doessel, (1988), Phelps (1989) and Fisher-Ellison and Hellerstein (1999),
for the general approach and Laxminarayan and Brown (2001), Rowthorne and Brown (2002), and
Laxminarayan and Weitzman (2002), for more in-depth studies of optimal allocation.
3also usually assumed. Exceptions to this are Brown and Gruben (1997) who formally
validate the generic intuition that a monopolist internalizes the externality when
product eﬀectiveness diminishes with use - as in the case of drug resistance, and
Laxminarayan (2002) who calls for an extension of patent breadth for new antibiotics.
We extend this literature by showing how a mixed competition/monopoly regime can
perform better than competition or monopoly alone.
We defer to future work the analysis of a number of other interesting features,
e.g., we abstract from strategic buying arguments. Likewise, we do not consider
quarantine-based policies or alternative allocation mechanisms such as drug cycling
and treatment randomization. We also disregard the complex procedures by which a a
government agency idiosyncratically negotiates prices with diﬀerent drug providers.5
Similarly we ignore the tension between R&D and markups to better focus on prices,
proﬁts, disease prevalence, and their welfare implications. Finally, while there may
be no mechanism or set of incentives that would lead any agent (private or public)
to achieve the ﬁrst best outcome and while the pharmaceutical industry is usually
oligopolistic, we believe that the social planning, monopolistic and competitive sce-
narios remain important benchmarks, which have been the focus of earlier work in
economic epidemiology.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the analytical framework.
Section 3 examines the dynamic problem of a treatment monopolist. Section 4 pro-
vides the counterpart analysis for a social planner. Section 5 discusses the welfare
implications of the previous results. Section 6 revisits the model when there is an
exogenous rate of infection or when the use of the drug spurs resistances. Section 7
concludes.
5See Horowitz and Moehring (2004).
42 Analytical Framework
2.1 Economic choice of the patient
In a population with size normalized to one, people have heterogenous preferences
over being healthy. The value of being sick and untreated is normalized to zero. The
taste parameter for being healthy θ is assumed to be distributed uniformly in the
interval [0,1]. The economic choice is between paying for a treatment or not.
Formally, letting u denote the utility function:
u = θ (healthy) θ ∈ [0,1]
u =0(sick untreated)
u = θ − p (treated)
Note that the purchase of the treatment does not protect those who are healthy;
therefore, only those who are sick might buy it. In other words, the individual gets
treated if and only if she is sick at period t and the beneﬁt exceeds the cost: θ >p t.
2.2 Biology
We now propose a simple transmission mechanism of the disease from one period to
the next. We make a few key, simplifying assumptions. The disease strikes through
person to person contacts upon random mixing. Sick people who did not purchase the
treatment recover naturally within the period t.6 Reinfetion may occur immediately
after so that neither treatment nor immediate natural recovery confers temporary im-
munity.7 Therefore contrary to vaccine models where demand may vanish altogether
6The model becomes drastically more complex if natural recovery from infection takes multiple
p e r i o d so rd o e sn o to c c u ru n l e s st h ep a t i e n ti st r e a t e d .
7Otherwise, the market value of being protected after being infected should enter people’s will-
ingness to pay for the drug. That value of being protected in the next period would depend on the
probability of being infected in the future. Therefore, the expected prevalence would need to enter
the formulation of the individual’s current willingness to pay if we stick to perfectly rational and
forward looking agents. I thank an anonymous referee for this remark. See Auld (2003) for a model
where expectations over the course of an epidemic aﬀect current behavior and therefore the spread
of the disease itself. This is precisely the complication we avoid here.
5under a given prevalence path (Geoﬀard and Philipson, 1997), there is always a posi-
tive demand for treatments for any positive prevalence. Yet most importantly, similar
to a vaccine model, a patient who has bought the treatment at t cannot transmit the
disease to others at t+1, so it is in that sense that the economic choice inﬂuences its
spread. In other words, anybody may become sick in any period, regardless of the
past, but prevalence at t+1is still a function of the proportion of those sick who did
not buy treatments in period t. This is the fundamental mechanism.
Our setup is clearly stylized and does not reproduce the exact transmission mode
of any speciﬁc disease. Rather, we would like to capture important general features of
communicable diseases diﬀusion under the constraint of analytical or computational
feasibility. However, we can still interpret the framework concretely. Perhaps the
simplest way to envision our problem is to think of a treatment for usually mild viral
ailments like the common cold and inﬂuenza strains for which there are no vaccines,
or bacterial illnesses such as step throat, impetigo or the scarlet fever (group A
streptococcal infections). The medication would alleviate the symptoms, accelerate
recovery and prevent the transmission of the disease, but not a future relapse.8
Formally, let the proportion of sick be r and let γ(.) be the transmission function.9
Instead of considering a simple parameter γ, we assume γ to be endogenous, reﬂecting
t h ei d e at h a tp e o p l et a k ep recautions to avoid a disease or that the disease aﬀects
certain categories of the population with more diﬃculty, perhaps because they are
healthier. One simple way to do this is to assume γ = γ(rt). Intuitively, one would
expect that if prevalence is close to zero, then γ(0) = γ i.e., the diseases propagates
naturally. On the other hand, the higher the prevalence the slower its spread, i.e.,
8Other diseases ﬁt the model to various extents. Some kinds of metapneumovirus and rotavirus
related illnesses share the main characteristics of person to person spread, natural recovery in most
cases and possible reinfection shortly after.
9γ may be interpreted as a policy instrument if we think of reducing the spread of a communicable
disease through mandatory quarantine. However, we defer the analysis of quarantine policy to a
further paper.
6γ0 < 0.10
2.3 Drug price-based disease transmssion
Deﬁne the indiﬀerent patient by θ
∗ = p. θ
∗represents the proportion of the r sick who
do not get treated. Therefore, γ(r)rp is the size of the market in the next period
and it depends on the key biological and economic parameters in a simple way. We
therefore posit:
rt+1 = min(γ(rt)rtpt,1) (1)
This guarantees that prevalence never exceeds 100%.
Note that the above assumptions limit the smoothness of the prevalence path.11
This is clearly because transition from sick state into healthy state is very fast. How-
ever, those assumptions eliminate extreme complications while keeping the necessary
ingredients of a communicable disease transmission model, now combined with a
typical industrial organization, agent-based structure.
3F i r m P r o b l e m
3.1 Two-period Case
This section is mainly illustrative and shows the mechanics of the model analytically.
Let δ be the discount factor and let c be the cost of producing the treatment, with
0 < δ < 1, 0 <c<1. For simplicity in this two-period case, γ(r)=γ.H e r e a n d
throughout the paper I assume no price discrimination. Let us assume that after the
second period, we have competitive pricing so there are no proﬁts to be made. The
10To keep things simple and to focus on the decision to buy treatments alone, conditional on being
sick, we do not to model prophylactic behavior explicitly.
11Prevalence swings unrealistically from one period to the next if the transmission function γ
takes too high values. Attention is therefore limited to low values of γ.
7ﬁrm solves:
maxp1{r(p1 − c)(1 − p1)+δmaxp2(p2 − c)(1 − p2)(γrp1)} (2)
Here, we assume for simplicity that the parameters are such that the condition
γrp1 < 1 is satisﬁed. Solving backward:
p2 =( 1+c)/2 >c (3)
(myopic, or one-shot monopolistic pricing)
Therefore, the ﬁrm problem is
maxp1 (p1 − c)(1 − p1)+δγ(1 − c)
2p1/4 (4)
This leads to
p1 =[ 1+c + δγ(1 − c)
2/4]/2 >p 2 (5)
The ﬁrm prices above the one-shot monopoly price because of the negative exter-
nality of treatment - from the ﬁrm’s perspective - on its future market.12
3.2 General Case
Solving for the monopolist optimal path in a three-period framework is relatively
straightforward but shows the inherent intractability of the analytical approach be-
yond two periods. Yet, the multi-period case oﬀers considerably more insights.
Loosely speaking, the monopolist must ﬁnd a path where current proﬁtd o e sn o t
compromise future discounted proﬁts too much. Here we are interested in solving
the above problem for an arbitrary number of periods and in characterizing in which
cases a ﬁrm would settle to a non-degenerate steady-state.
12Note that the result would not change if sick untreated people in period one were still sick in
period two because on the average, people’s willingness to pay would be lower, as in the standard
durable good model; hence, the two eﬀects would go in the same direction.
83.2.1 Framework





trt(pt − c)(1 − pt) such that rt+1 =m i n ( γ(rt)rtpt,1) (6)
We solve the problem through the Bellman equation approach:
Vt(rt)=m a x {rt(pt − c)(1 − pt)+δV (rt+1)} (7)
such that rt+1 =m i n ( γ(rt)rtpt,1)
g i v e na ni n i t i a lr0 and boundary condition VT(rT)=[ ( 1− c)2/4)]rT.
The Bellman approach approximates the domain of the state variable with a
grid and discretizes the objective function and law of motion. The procedure solves
backwards a system Vt(xt)=max[vt(xt,u t)+ δVt+1(f(xt,u t))],w h e r evt(xt,u t) is the
objective function and xt+1 = f(xt,u t) is the law of motion. This method is adapted
to our problem because it can be applied to any function vt(xt,u t) and f(xt,u t) and
performs very well in dimension one or two.
The simulations results are presented for a ﬁxed number of periods (50): T periods
of optimization correspond to T iterations of the contraction mapping and therefore
it is a good approximation of the inﬁnite horizon model.13
3.2.2 Results
There are no analytic solutions for this problem, so therefore we carried enough sim-
ulations to encompass all relevant, qualitatively diﬀerent cases. A natural candidate
13The convergence is exponential and the smaller the discount factor, the better the convergence.
The problem exhibits the turnpike property (Intriligator, 1971, chapter 16) : the diﬀerence with
the inﬁnite horizon model occurs only as t approaches T so the conclusions of the ﬁnite horizon
simulation extend to an inﬁnite horizon.
9for γ(r) is γ(r)=γ(1−r) where γ is a parameter to be chosen.14 We have three free
parameters (δ,c,γ)15 and for each triplet selection, we show in the illustrative graphs
the paths corresponding to three starting values of the prevalence r0. We restricted
attention to high values of the discount rate (with an emphasis on the case δ =0 .95
where a period can be interpreted as a year) since low discount rates can hardly be
assigned any realistic economic meaning here. For brevity, we include in the appen-
dix only representative pictures of qualitatively diﬀerent cases. In each picture, the
diﬀerent paths drawn correspond to diﬀerent starting points r0.
Several main features emerge from the simulations. The most important one is
undoubtedly the fact that the monopoly price and prevalence paths typically converge
to a unique steady state (ﬁgures 1a and 1b).16 It echoes Geoﬀard and Philipson’s
(1997) assertion that no cycle can occur in a vaccination model as long as demand
responds to current - as opposed to lagged - prevalence. Another point is that the
monopolist keeps prices above the myopic (or one-shot) price (1 + c)/2,j u s ta si n
two-period case. The intuition for this result is the same as before. In Kessing and
Nuscheler’s (2005) model, the monopolist creates a high prevalence among the poor
so that the rich be more likely to buy vaccines. Here, because we are dealing with
treatments, this mechanism is even more direct: the monopolist prices high so that
al o to fp o o rd on o tb u yt h et r e a t m e n t sa n di n c r e a s et h ec h a n c et h a ts o m er i c hw i l l
be infected subsequently.
The starting prevalence is relevant : starting prices can be increasing or decreasing,
14Of course this implies rt+1 → 0 as rt → 1 and bumpy paths for high values of γ;t h i si sw h y
attention is limited to low values of γ. However, we have checked that smoother functions γ(r) with
γ(0) = γ and γ0 < 0 -s u c ha sγ(r)=γ exp(−rt) - keep the key features of the solution. Further, it
is worth noting that if we assume γ(r)=γ for most values of γ the monopolist prices so as to make
nearly everyone sick in every period.
15The diﬀerent choices of γ are not derived from any known biological model and in that sense
can be considered ad hoc.
16As the pictures show, given a certain triplet (δ,c,γ), depending on the initial r0, the diﬀerent
paths converge more or less rapidly to the same steady-state.
10as opposed, this time, to the two-period model. As γ increases, the convergence to the
steady state is quicker and the prices get closer to the myopic monopoly price (ﬁgures
2a and 2b). The future market plays a less important role in the ﬁrm’s strategy. High
values of γ should be thought of as degenerate cases.
Increases in δ have little qualitative eﬀects on the prevalence and price paths in
general. As c increases, steady-state infection levels increase, prices increase, and
obviously the diﬀerence between the optimal price and the myopic price decreases.
4P u b l i c I n t e r v e n t i o n
4.1 Two-period Case
The rationale for intervention is the standard argument on the positive externality
from protection, treatment, or vaccination. The study of the planner’s behavior in a
ﬁnite horizon case helps understand the issue at stake.
In this case, it is obvious that in the ﬁnal period, price equals marginal cost
because there is no positive externality involved. For simplicity in this two-period
case, again we assume γ(r)=γ.




θdθ +( 1− r)/2+δ[γp1r
Z 1
c




−rc(1 − p1) − δγp1r(1 − c)c (8)
The solution is:
p1 = δγ(c
2/2 − c)+c<c= p2 (9a)
Therefore, the social optimum price in period 1 is lower than the marginal cost.
The intuition is the exact reverse of the argument given for the monopoly. Hence the
distortion incurred by monopolistic pricing is decreasing over time in the two-period
11case.17
4.2 General Case
We are mainly interested in characterizing those situations when a planner would
choose to eradicate the disease.
4.2.1 Framework








(θ − c)dθ]+( 1− rt)/2} such that rt+1 =m i n ( γ(rt)rtpt,1) (10)
T h es a m ea p p r o a c ha sa b o v ei su s e dt os o l v et h i sp r o b l e m .N o t et h a tf o rt h ec a s e
γ(r)=γ(1 − r) the disease is eventually eradicated if c<1/γ (recall pplanner ≤ c)
since it implies rt+1 <r t(1 − rt) and for any ζ such that 0 < ζ < 1 the series {rt}t≥0
deﬁned by rt+1 = ζrt(1 − rt) converges to zero (for any r0 < 1).
4.2.2 Results
The most striking aspect that emerges from the simulations is that for low enough
values of the marginal cost c, the planner always achieves eradication within a few
periods (ﬁgures 3a and 3b). For higher values of c, other considerations may take
place. In the limit, if the future is highly discounted (low δ), then the planner would
settle to a nonzero steady-state. In that case, the higher γ, the closer the price to
marginal cost: we conclude that subsidization is fruitless when the disease is spreading
so quickly that the planner has no control over prevalence. However subsidization
does not only make sense if the planner can achieve eradication: we found that for
low δ and low γ, the planner may settle for a non-zero steady-state with a price path
17Note that it has been implicitly assumed that taxation is neutral (i.e., no welfare loss from
raising revenue), since the positive diﬀerence c − p1 must eventually be ﬁnanced through taxes.
12signiﬁcantly below c. Although we could only produce this last result for low (and
therefore, from a practical standpoint, implausible) values of δ, within this version of
the model, we will see later it has valuable policy implications.
Finally, for high enough δ,w eﬁnd that the disease is always eradicated: the
present value of a disease-free world dominates all other factors. This aggressive sub-
sidization strategy leading to eradication is on a par with Barett and Hoel’s (2004)
intuition that a permanent high level of disease control cannot be optimal: the divi-
dend of eradication for future generations is worth the short run cost of a big push.
This outcome is also to be contrasted with Goldman and Lightwood’s (2002) con-
clusion that in the SIS model, decreased levels of treatment are optimal for higher
disease levels. As the authors put it, this appears as a consequence of the increased
likelihood of reinfection in the presence of a larger infected proportion of the pop-
ulation. In this paper, we do have an extreme version of that proposition, but it
only holds when the disease is out of control.18 Given the diﬃculty of eradicating a
disease through vaccination with Pigouvian subsidies (Geoﬀard and Philipson, 1997)
the analysis suggests that eradication with treatments may be easier to achieve than
through vaccination alone if those treated do not spread the disease.
5W e l f a r e c o m p a r i s o n s
5.1 Two period Case
It is clear that the planner’s allocation strictly dominates the others (once again, if
taxation is non distortionary and there is no excess cost of raising revenues), and
that the competitive equilibrium dominates the monopoly’s (because of the presence
of the positive externality, combined with the usual welfare loss from market power).
18However, the optimal level of treatment is certainly sensitive to assumptions regarding length
of immunity and policy makers should pay particular attention to that feature of the disease trans-
mission mechanism.
13However, it can be easily shown that the comparison between the mandatory universal
treatment policy - being deﬁned as one where all the sick are immediately cured (at
marginal cost) - and the monopoly is ambiguous. Similarly, the ambiguity is also
present when comparing perfect competition with the mandatory treatment case.
5.2 General case
We are interested in welfare comparisons between the monopolist, the planner, the
competitive and the mandatory universal treatment cases. The results are presented
for all starting possible values of infection levels r0. It is important to keep in mind
that the scale chosen depends on the parameter δ.
In most cases, welfare under mandatory universal treatment and under social
planning are very similar (ﬁgures 4, 5, 6). This should not be surprising since erad-
ication is almost always optimal and achieved rapidly. Mandatory treatment is less
likely to be close to optimal when δ is low and c is high, and the diﬀerence be-
comes more signiﬁcant when the initial prevalence is high enough (ﬁgure 4). In that
case, mandatory treatment is too expensive. It can indeed be less eﬃcient than the
competitive outcome and even the monopoly outcome (ﬁgures 4, 5). Surplus under
mandatory treatment is always a linear function (contrary to surplus under diﬀerent
assumptions) since it has the eﬀect of curing everybody immediately and therefore
escapes the inﬂuence of the law of motion of the disease. The diﬀerence between
surplus under monopoly and under perfect competition decreases with c (ﬁgure 6).
Note that he U shape welfare curves arise only because a very high r0 implies a very
low r1.19
Finally, we checked for consistency purposes that welfare under perfect competi-
tion always lies between monopoly and social planner’s levels. The lower the marginal
19I thank an anonymous referee for pointing it out. Other speciﬁcations of γ(r) without the
rt+1 → 0 as rt → 1 feature show a strictly decreasing surplus.
14cost c, the more welfare levels under competition get closer to the planner’s, and ob-
viously welfare under competition dominates monopoly outcomes in all situations.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 Exogenous Rate of Infection
For many diseases, eradication is simply impossible. This would happen if the
pathogens responsible for them are airborne or so prevalent in the environment,
for example through animal vectors, that it would require unrealistic sterilization
measures.20
6.1.1 Adding an exogenous component to the equations
Among the non-sick (1 − rt) at time t, we have a proportion γ(rt)rtpt that is going
to be infected through the mechanism described in the previous section, and among
those not infected through that mechanism, a proportion φ infected exogenously. It
translates as:
rt+1 =m i n ( γ(rt)rtpt + φ(1 − γ(rt))rtpt),1) (11)
⇔ rt+1 =m i n ( ( γ0 + γ1(rt))rtpt,1) where γ0 = φ and γ1(r)=( 1− φ)γ(r)
6.1.2 Comparison of the results
It is most interesting to see if the planner still follows the same strategy, now that
the ﬁnal eradication outcome is unattainable by construction. Overall, the answer
is that yes, the planner continues to heavily subsidize the treatment even if the
steady-state of infection that follows is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (ﬁgures 7a,
20This is true even in hospitals where hospital-acquired infections are responsible for thousands of
deaths each year. See Gersovitz and Hammer (2005) for an analysis of pure vector-borne infections
in developing countries. We do not consider an endogenous population of vectors here.
157b). Consequently, the planner’s steady-state is close to γ0. Consistent with earlier
results, the planner stops subsidizing and sets prices at marginal cost when it loses
control of the infection. Only then is subsidization fruitless. This corresponds to
cases when the discount factor δ is small and when either the exogenous parameter
of infection γ is high or the cost c is high, or both. The intuition for the diﬀerence
between our results and Goldman and Lightwood’s (2002) remains the same.
The monopoly solution does not add additional qualitative insights. Now with an
exogenous prevalence, the monopolist is able to maintain a steady-state of infection
and follows the strategy described earlier. As for the welfare comparisons, evidently,
the mandatory treatment policy (meaning in this case that everybody is treated each
period) will be dramatically less eﬃcient the higher the cost c and therefore more
often dominated by the other outcomes (ﬁgure 8).
6.2 Resistances
We theoretically do not need communicable diseases to analyze drug resistance. How-
ever, because resistance can be conceptualized as the negative externality of current
treatment on future treatment, it makes sense to study the phenomenon within the
framework we have used so far.
Treatment eﬀectiveness is a natural, economic resource. Similar to the notion of
a stock that is being depleted, current treatment use lowers future eﬀectiveness.21
Pathogens inevitably acquire resistances to survive treatments through natural se-
lection. Resistant strains are usually not treatment-induced mutants. Rather, they
often exist naturally but in insigniﬁcant proportions due to a so-called ﬁtness deﬁcit
(or cost) compared to other germs of the same category.22 However, as treatments
21See for example Baumol (1996), Brown and Layton (1996), Cohen (1992), Levy (1997) etc.
22See e.g., Munroe (1997), for the same idea in the context of pest resistance.
16destroy the susceptible strains, the proportion of resistant types increases.23 The
dramatic increase in the percentage of staphylococci strains that show resistance to
e.g., penicillin, tetracycline, and chloramphenicol24 justify that ﬁrms must take drug
resistance into consideration.25
6.2.1 Modeling Resistance
We build on Fisher-Ellison and Hellerstein (1999) who use a transparent two-period
model to allow for the externality of drug use. The following model assumes that
in each period t, the use of the treatment destroys an endogenous proportion Ht
of the non-resistant strains. The “hole” created in the ﬂora is ﬁlled through the
reproduction of the survivors, which now contain a higher proportion of resistant
types. The equation governing the proportion of resistant strains Ω is thus given by:
Ωt+1 =m i n [ Ωt[1 + (1 − Ωt)Ht],1] with Ω0 = ² (12)
Note that since H is a proportion we have Ωt+1 ≥ Ωt and Ωt ≤ 1.
The original steady-state proportion, absent treatment is ².I fH is constant, Ω
is a sigmoid function, which is consistent with the biological literature on the topic
(Austin et al., 1999).26
Here, we present results for the case where patients buy the treatment only if it
is eﬃcient, that is, if they do not carry the resistant type (which we assume can be
found out subject to a costless test). The results are not qualitatively modiﬁed if
23When treatments are suspended, the proportion of resistant types is theoretically supposed to
move back to its initial, inﬁnitesimal steady-state level. Yet, it is not known if such a reversal trend
is a valid stylized fact at the aggregate level - see Levy (1997). For simplicity we ignore the modeling
of ﬁtness deﬁcit.
24Daily and Ehrlich (1996). See also Fisher (1994).
25See Kline (1989).
26In theoretical biology, modeling resistance through diﬀerential equations is the norm, but there
is no commonly adopted law of motion. Ours is a very simpliﬁed and stylized approach.
17we change the problem to allow patients who carry the resistant strain to buy the
treatment. Note that the growth of resistance is not aﬀected by either assumption.
It is not easy to ﬁn dac o m p e l l i n gf u n c t i o nH. An intuitive start, however, is to
assume that the proportion of non-resistant strains destroyed is proportional to the
number of treated individuals, i.e. those sick patients who do not have the resistant
strain and are willing to pay for the treatment, so that :
Ht =m i n [ hrt(1 − pt)(1 − Ωt),1] where h is a constant. (13)
The maximization problems above are therefore modiﬁed by letting the population
who buys the treatment at time t be: rt(1 − pt)(1 − Ωt) and by adding the equation
for resistance as an additional constraint of the monopolist’s and planner’s problems.
Again, we choose diﬀerent values for h to span as broad a range of qualitatively
diﬀerent cases as possible.
6.2.2 Results with resistance
It turns out that the main results do not diﬀer qualitatively from when there is no
resistance. 3D graphs, available upon request, can account for the diﬀerent parame-
trizations of h in the former cases examined. The major discrepancy is that in the
majority of cases where the planner achieves eradication, the diﬀerence in welfare is
larger since eventually monopoly pricing leads to full resistance.
A key question is whether monopoly pricing ever yields higher welfare than com-
petitive pricing. Intuitively, it is possible since we now have two external eﬀects going
in opposite directions while it is ambiguous which one dominates.27 However, quite
surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the present value of welfare under monopoly is never higher
27To assess this issue we only need to examine high values of the discount factor δ since otherwise
the present value of welfare under competition would necessarily be higher than under monopoly,
even if resistance is better controlled by a monopoly. Also, with a high δ the monopoly is more
likely to internalize the resistance path in its pricing.
18than under competition, except when h is very high, in which case resistance almost
immediately increases to 100% and the treatment becomes obsolete. This is of course
a pathological case, which indicates that the positive externality of treatment gener-
ically dominates the negative externality of resistance in our model. It goes without
saying that this result would not necessarily (and actually would less likely) hold if
we analyzed the resistance phenomenon for non-communicable diseases. There, the
tension would simply arise from classical, market power-induced deadweight loss vs.
negative externality internalization.28
Still, we focus on ﬁnding cases, within our framework, where ﬁne tuning the
introduction of monopoly pricing improves welfare. If we characterize such situations,
t h ec o n c l u s i o n sw o u l db ea l lt h em o r er e l e v a n tf o ro t h e rd i s e a s e sw h e r et h e r ea r e
no positive treatment externalities present. It turns out that introducing monopoly
power after a period of competitive pricing may outperform competition in all periods.
The idea for correctly introducing monopoly power is to choose periods when the
diﬀerence between optimal pricing (the planner’s choice) and competitive pricing is
greatest. In such cases, the monopolist’s price is closer to the planner’s than to the
competitive price, and the negative externality of resistance is so much better handled
by the monopolist that it more than compensates for the loss of positive externality
eﬀects under competitive pricing.29






T combinations of monopoly pricing periods within
T periods. By solving the optimization problem backward choosing at each stage
between competitive price and the optimal monopoly price, we can ﬁnd a competitive
28See Brown and Gruben (1997): their natural conclusion is that a monopoly may do better than
competition when the welfare cost of failing to protect product eﬀectiveness is greater than the
welfare cost of market power.
29However, the mixed regime does not improve on competition as much if we allow all patients
to buy the treatment because the monopoly does not have an incentive to control resistance then.
19s u r p l u st h a ti sl e s st h a nt h eo p t i m a lm i x e dr e g i m es u r p l u s .T h i sﬁnding is important
because it opens the possibility of adding patent life years for the inventor of a new
drug - the only incentive for private R&D - yet without harming welfare ex post.
Patent policy usually does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of discoveries.
Yet, within the pharmaceutical industry, we may think about implementing patent
structures speciﬁc to antibiotics, an idea explored by Laxminarayan (2002) who an-
alyzes patent breadth. Here, we propose a patent scheme where patent duration is
based on resistance levels. We reﬁne the proposal of the now defunct U.S. Oﬃce of
Technology Assessment (1995) which advocated extending antibiotic patent length to
let patentees internalize the externality costs of resistance. Such an extension needs
not kick in when the patent expires only.
Realistically, if the planner regrants monopoly rights after patent expiration, it
will presumably be on the same model as the initial patent, i.e., a certain time interval
of monopoly power. In other words, after its initial patent expiration, a monopolist
would get an extension on an interval [t1,t 2]. The planner would then choose t1and t2
to maximize welfare:.
pmix = {
c at the interval [0,t 1]
pmon at the interval [t1,t 2]
c at the interval [t2,T]
,w h e r et h ep r i c epmon is the optimal monopoly
price on the interval [t1,t 2].
We ﬁnd that welfare under pure competition is less than under the switching
regime just described. Figure 10a provides a graphical illustration for the optimal
choice of parameters (t1,t 2) and ﬁgures 10b and 10c oﬀer a comparison of the price
and resistance paths under the competitive, monopoly and mixed regimes.
Obviously, the initial pricing phase should be monopolistic: an optimal patent
scheme should maximize the ex ante welfare, that is taking into consideration the
impact of expected discounted proﬁts on R&D eﬀort, which should therefore be re-
warded early on. However, patent life may be covering not only the initial pricing
20phase but also later phases, presumably when the sigmoid path of resistance is steep-
est. That is, when the externality of resistance is such that welfare under monopoly
is closer to ﬁrst best than to welfare under competition. Given that proﬁts are
discounted, if that period happens too far away in the future after regular patent
expiration, it would not change existing patent structure much in terms of R&D in-
centives. Still, theoretically, we can envision a shorter initial patent to be reconducted
at a later time: in other words, the initial patent phase would stop when the present
value of proﬁts under the (usual) remaining patent phase equals the present value
of future proﬁts under regranted patent, later on - when resistance is high enough.
However, in practice, given that cutting on initial patent time is probably unrealistic,
we suggest that patents for antibiotics follow a simple rule of thumb: keeping the
initial patent length - as for any other drug - and regranting intellectual property
rights to the innovator when the growth of resistance exceeds a certain threshold.
7 Concluding Observations
This work is a contribution to the economics of communicable diseases and drug
resistance. We build a stylized model of disease transmission and conduct numerical
simulations under diﬀerent market and epidemiological environments. In particular,
the paper characterizes a drug monopoly and a social planner’s pricing strategies,
their corresponding prevalence paths and welfare outcomes. The analysis expands
with the introduction of exogenous infection rates and drug resistance. The main
results are that the monopolist sets prices to reach a steady-state of infection, while
the planner generally eradicates the disease, or subsidizes treatments when eradication
is impossible or too costly, as long as it retains some control over prevalence. In the
presence of drug resistance, regranting intellectual property rights for some time after
initial patent expiration and a phase of competitive pricing can prove desirable when
21the growth of resistance exceeds a certain threshold, thus providing both higher ex
post welfare and greater incentives for private R&D.
The policy implications of this work are multiple. Since ﬁrst best pricing generally
leads to rapid eradication, should it be cost eﬀective, public health decision makers
should not hesitate to implement mandatory treatment programs for communicable
diseases.30 When a drug is under patent, knowing which steady-state price the ﬁrm
is aiming at should help social security oﬃcials in bargaining over the determination
of the drug price and of its coverage over time. Regarding the design of patents,
this work shows that implementing original, resistance level-based patent schemes
may be desirable. Independent monitoring of the evolution of drug resistance and
cooperation of generics producers are therefore critical to the success of this idea.
Many extensions of this work are conceivable, for example by considering that
pharmaceutical development is characterized by large ﬁx e dc o s t sw h i c hs u b j e c tp r i c e
paths to a break-even constraint. In particu l a r ,a no v e r l o o k e da s p e c to fR & Do nc o m -
municable diseases and drug resistance is that private innovation is only stimulated
when there is a large enough demand so that a ﬁrm may earn positive proﬁts.31 This
may result in diverting R&D from slow growth diseases, in the planned obsolescence
of previous drugs or in a ﬁrm sleeping on its patent if a communicable disease or
resistance spreads fast enough.32
30The 2003 SARS epidemic exampliﬁed the necessity of sanctions for people with symptoms but
unsure of their condition or aﬀraid to go to the hospital - the most dangerous places to be at the
time.
31It can even be proved that if a new drug is brought to the market only once a certain resistance
level for the old drug is reached, and if resistance grows asymptotically to that level, a policy
discretely increasing resistance would be desirable at some point.
32Implausible as it may sound, this seems to haveh a p p e n e di nar e l a t e dc o n t e x tw h e nam a j o r
anti virus software company apparently withheld information about at least one big cyberthreat for
hours after spotting it, possibly harming millions of Internet users.
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Figure 10 a: The optimal choice of parameters: t1=8, t2 =12 
 
 
       
 
Figure 10 b: price path    Figure 10c: resistance path under monopoly (dotted 
line), mixed regime (solid line) and competition (dashed line) 